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Abstract
Type-flaw attacks and multi-protocol attacks are notorious threats to cryptographic
protocol security. They are arguably the most commonly reported attacks on protocols.
For nearly fifteen years, researchers have continuously emphasized the importance of
preventing these attacks.
In their classical works, Heather et al. and Guttman et al. proved that these could
be prevented by tagging encrypted messages with distinct constants, in a standard
protocol model with a free message algebra [23, 21].
However, most “real-world” protocols such as SSL 3.0 are designed with the
Exclusive-OR (XOR) operator that possesses algebraic properties, breaking the free
algebra assumption. These algebraic properties induce equational theories that need
to be considered when analyzing protocols that use the operator.
This is the problem we consider in this paper: We prove that, under certain as-
sumptions, tagging encrypted components still prevents type-flaw and multi-protocol
attacks even in the presence of the XOR operator and its algebraic properties.
Keywords: Cryptographic protocols, Type-flaw attacks, Multi-protocol attacks, Tagging,
Exclusive-OR, Algebraic properties, Equational theories, Constraint solving.
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1 Introduction
A type-flaw attack on a protocol is an attack where a message variable of one type is es-
sentially substituted with a message of a different type, to cause a violation of a security
property. Preventing type-flaw attacks is crucial for security protocols since they are fre-
quently reported in literature [10, 27, 36].
In their pioneer work, Heather et al. proved that pairing constants called “tags” with
each message, prevents type-flaw attacks [23]. However, Heather et al.’s work considered
a basic protocol model with a free message algebra. Operators such as Exclusive-OR pos-
sess algebraic properties that violate the free algebra assumption, by inducing equational
theories.
Another very important problem for security protocols is the problem of multiple pro-
tocols executing in parallel. This was shown to be a major cause for attacks on proto-
cols [25, 16]. In an outstanding work, Guttman et al. tackled this problem and proved that
if distinct protocol identifiers were to be inserted as tags inside all encrypted components,
multi-protocol attacks can be prevented [21], in the same year and conference as that of
Heather et al.’s paper [22]. However, like Heather et al., they too consider a basic and
standard model with a free term algebra.
Recent focus in research projects world-wide has been to extend protocol analysis to
protocols that use operators possessing algebraic properties, to accommodate “real-world”
protocols such as SSL 3.0 (e.g. [26, 18]). Naturally, a corresponding study into type-flaw
and multi-protocol attacks would be both crucial and interesting.
These are the problems we consider in this paper: We provide formal proofs to establish
that suggestions similar to those made by Heather et al. and Guttman et al (to tag messages),
are sufficient to prevent all type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks on security protocols even
under the ACUN1 algebraic properties of the Exclusive-OR (XOR) operator.
Our proof approach extends that used by us in [29], is general, and could be extended
to other operators with equations such as Inverse and Idempotence in addition to ACUN.
We give some intuitions for these in our conclusion.
Significance of the results to protocol analysis and verification. Preventing type-flaw
and multi-protocol attacks is obviously beneficial to protocol security. However, there are
also significant advantages to protocol analysis and verification:
• As Heather et al. pointed out, preventing type-flaw attacks also allows many un-
bounded verification approaches (e.g. [42, 11, 24]) to be meaningful, since they as-
sume the absence of type-flaw attacks;
• Similarly, preventing multi-protocol attacks ensures that it is sufficient to analyze
protocols in isolation, which was found to be much less complicated than analyzing
in multi-protocol environments [35, 25];
• Furthermore, knowing that these attacks can be prevented in advance, reduces com-
plexity of analysis and substantially saves the search space for automated tools;
1Associativity, Commutativity, existence of Unity and Nilpotence.
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• Preventing type-flaw attacks is a crucial step in achieving decidability results for
protocol security, as identified in [28, 39]. With decidability results in place, protocol
verification can be reduced to a trivial problem of analyzing a single session of a
protocol, to conclude its security.
The main concept used by our proofs is as follows. When terms containing XOR are
unified, the ACUN theory does not affect the unifier obtained, if all the terms that are XORed
are tagged with constants. Thus, unifiers for unification problems involving the standard
operators and the XOR operator are obtained only using the algorithm for the standard
operators. Hence, the results that were possible for the standard operators remain intact,
even when the XOR operator is used in constructing messages.
Organization. In Section 2, we will show that tagging can prevent type-flaw attacks un-
der XOR using an example. In Section 3, we will formalize our framework to model proto-
cols and their executions. In Section 4, we will prove some useful lemmas. In Section 5, we
will use these lemmas to achieve our main results and conclude with a discussion of future
and related works. We provide an index to the notation and terminology used in the paper
in Appendix A.1 and a detailed description of Baader & Schulz algorithm for combined
theory unification [2] using an example in Appendix A.2.
2 Tagging prevents type-flaw attacks under XOR: Exam-
ple
In this section, we show that tagging prevents type-flaw attacks under XOR on an example.
The example helps in elucidating our proof strategy to achieve our main results in the
subsequent sections.
Consider the adapted Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol (NSL⊕) by Chevalier et al. [6].
We further modify it by inserting numbers 1, 2, and 3 inside each encrypted message as
suggested by Heather et al. [23]:
Msg 1. A→ B : [1, NA, A]pk(B)
Msg 2. B → A : [2, NA ⊕B,NB]pk(A)
Msg 3. A→ B : [3, NB]pk(B)
(A and B are agent variables; NA, NB are nonce variables; [X ]Y represents X en-
crypted with Y ; pk(X) is the public-key of X).
A type-flaw attack is possible on this protocol even in the presence of component num-
bering (originally presented in [33]):
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Msg α.1. a→ i : [1, na, a]pk(i)
Msg β.1. i(a)→ b : [1, na ⊕ b⊕ i, a]pk(b)
Msg β.2. b→ i(a) : [2, na ⊕ b⊕ i⊕ b, nb]pk(a)
Msg α.2. i→ a : [2, na ⊕ i, nb]pk(a) (replaying Msg β.2)
Msg α.3. a→ i : [3, nb]pk(i)
Msg β.3. i(a)→ b : [3, nb]pk(b)
i is the identity of the intruder or attacker; i(x) denotes i spoofing as x. We use lower-
case now for agent identities and nonces (a, b, na, nb), since this is a trace of the protocol
execution, not the protocol specification.
Notice the type-flaw in the first message (na ⊕ b ⊕ i substituted for the claimed NA)
that induces a type-flaw in the second message as well. This is strictly a type-flaw attack,
since without the type-flaw and consequently without exploiting the algebraic properties,
the attack is not possible.
The above attack can be avoided if tagging were to be adopted for the elements of the
XOR operator as well:
Msg 1. A→ B : [1, NA, A]pk(B)
Msg 2. B → A : [2, [4, NA]⊕ [5, B], NB]pk (A)
Msg 3. A→ B : [3, NB]pk(B)
Now Msg β.2 is not replayable as Msg α.2 even when i(a) sends Msg β.1 as
Msg β.1. i(a)→ b : [1, [4, na]⊕ [5, b]⊕ [5, i], a]pk(b),
since Msg β.2 then becomes
Msg β.2. b→ i(a) : [2, [4, [4, na]⊕ [5, b]⊕ [5, i]]⊕ [5, b], nb]pk(a).
This is not replayable as the required:
Msg α.2. i→ a : [2, [4, na]⊕ [5, i], nb]pk (a)
because, inside Msg β.2, one occurence of [5, b] is in [4, [4, na]⊕ [5, b]⊕ [5, i]] and the
other is outside. Hence, they cannot be canceled.
This concept can be best understood when we review the attack symbolically. The crux
of the attack was the unification of terms, NA⊕ b (sent by agent b inside Msg 2) with na⊕ i
(expected by agent a inside Msg 2). The result is a substitution of na ⊕ i⊕ b with the type
nonce⊕ agent⊕ agent to the nonce variable NA, resulting in a mismatch of types.
When we prevented the attack by adding more tags, the terms [4, NA] ⊕ [5, b] and
[4, na] ⊕ [5, i] had to be unified. But they are not unifiable, since no substitution to the
variable NA will make them equal under the ACUN theory for the ⊕ operator.
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Note that, a substitution of na ⊕ b ⊕ i to NA will make them equal, if an additional
equation, say [w, x]⊕ [y, z] = [w⊕ y, x⊕ z] is considered in addition to the ACUN theory.
In this case, [4, NA]⊕[5, b] will become [4⊕5, na⊕b⊕i⊕b], which is equal to [4⊕5, na⊕
i], which in turn is equal to the other term to be unified, [4, na] ⊕ [5, i]. However, in this
paper, we consider only the ACUN algebraic properties of the⊕ operator, but not equations
where both the standard operators such as pairing and the XOR operator are combined. We
do provide some insights into extending our work with such equations, in our conclusion.
In Sections 3, 4 and 5, we will prove formally that such tagging prevents all type-flaw
and multi-protocol attacks on protocols in general, under the ACUN theory.
3 The Framework
In this section, we will describe our formal framework to model the design and analy-
sis of protocols, which we subsequently use to achieve the proofs for our main results in
Section 5.
We will define the term algebra in Section 3.1, the protocol model in Section 3.2, gener-
ating symbolic constraint sequences for protocol messages and checking their satisfiability
in Section 3.3, the security properties desired of protocols and attacks on them in Sec-
tion 3.4 and our main protocol design requirements to prevent type-flaw and multi-protocol
attacks in Section 3.5.
3.1 Term Algebra
We will first introduce the construction of protocol messages using some basic elements and
operators in Section 3.1.1. We will then introduce equational unification in Section 3.1.2.
We derive much of our concepts here from Tuengerthal’s technical report [43] where
he has provided an excellent and clear explanation of equational unification.
3.1.1 Terms
We will use italics font for sets, functions, and operators. On the other hand, we will use
sans-serif font for predicates, equations and theories (described in Section 3.1.2).
We denote the term algebra as T (F,Vars), where Vars is a set of variables, and F is a
set of function symbols or operators, called a signature. The terms in T (F,Vars) are called
F -Terms. Further,
• Vars ⊂ T (F,Vars);
• (∀f ∈ F )(arity(f) > 0 ∧ t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (F,Vars)⇒ f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T (F,Vars)).
The set of nullary function symbols are called constants. We assume that every variable
and constant have a “type” such as Agent , Nonce etc., returned by a function type().
We define F as StdOps ∪ {XOR} ∪ Constants, where,
StdOps = {sequence, penc, senc, pk , sh}.
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Further, if f ∈ F and t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (F,Vars) then,
type(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(type(t1), . . . , type(tn)).
penc and senc denote asymmetric and symmetric encryption operators respectively. pk
and sh denote public-key and shared-key operators respectively. We assume that they will
always be used with one and two arguments respectively, that are of the type Agent .
We use some syntactic sugar in using some of these operators:
sequence(t1, . . . , tn) = [t1, . . . , tn],
penc(t, k) = [t]→k ,
senc(t, k) = [t]↔k ,
XOR(t1, . . . , tn) = t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn.
We will omit the superscripts ↔ and → for encryptions if the mode of encryption is
contextually obvious or irrelevant.
We will write a in [a1, . . . , an] if a ∈ {a1, . . . , an}. We will denote the linear ordering
relation of a sequence of elements, s, as ≺s. For instance, if s is a sequence such that
s = [s1, . . . , sn], then, (∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n})((i < j)⇒ (si ≺s sj)).
We define the subterm relation as follows:
t ⊏ t′ iff t′ = f(t1, . . . , tn) where f ∈ F and t ⊏ t′′ for some t′′ ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}.
We will use functions Vars(), Constants(), and SubTerms() on a single term or sets of
terms, that return the variables, constants and subterms in them respectively. For instance,
if T is a set of terms,
SubTerms(T ) = {t | (∃t′ ∈ T )(t ⊏ t′)}.
3.1.2 Equational Unification
We will now introduce the concepts of unification under equational theories. We will start
off with some basic definitions:
Definition 1. [Substitution]
A substitution is a tuple 〈x, X〉 (denoted x/X), where x is a term and X is a variable.
Let σ be a set of substitutions and t be a term. Then,
tσ = t, if t ∈ Constants ,
= t′, if t′/t ∈ σ,
= f(t1σ, . . . , tnσ), if f ∈ F, and t = f(t1, . . . , tn).
We extend this definition to define substitutions to a set of terms: If T is a set of terms,
then, Tσ = {tσ | t ∈ T}.
We will now introduce equational theories.
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Definition 2. [Identity and Equational Theory]
Given a signature F , and a set of variables Vars , a set of identities E is a subset
of T (F,Vars) × T (F,Vars). We denote an identity as t ∼= t′ where t and t′ belong to
T (F,Vars). An equational theory (or simply a theory) =E is the least congruence relation
on T (F,Vars), that is closed under substitution and contains E. i.e.,
=E :=
{
R |
R is a congruence relation on T (F,Vars), E ⊆ R, and
(∀σ)(t ∼= t′ ∈ R⇒ tσ ∼= t′σ ∈ R)
}
We write t =E t′ if (t, t′) belongs to =E .
For the signature of this paper, we define two theories, =STD and =ACUN.
The theory =STD for StdOps-Terms is based on a set of identities between syntactically
equal terms, except for those made with the operator sh:
STD =
{[t1, . . . , tn] ∼= [t1, . . . , tn],
h(t) ∼= h(t),
sigk(t) ∼= sigk(t),
pk(t) ∼= pk(t),
[t]k ∼= [t]k,
sh(t1, t2) ∼= sh(t2, t1)}.
The theory =ACUN is based on identities solely with the XOR (⊕) operator, reflecting the
algebraic properties of XOR:
ACUN = {t1 ⊕ (t2 ⊕ t3) ∼= (t1 ⊕ t2)⊕ t3, t1 ⊕ t2 ∼= t2 ⊕ t1, t⊕ 0 ∼= t, t⊕ t ∼= 0}.
We will say that a term t is pure wrt theory =E iff there exists a substitution σ and a
term t′ such that t = t′σ and either2 ≈ t′ or t′ ≈ belongs to E.
pure(t,=E)⇔ (∃t
′; σ)((t = t′σ) ∧ ((t′ ≈ ∈ E) ∨ ( ≈ t′ ∈ E))).
We will say that a term t is an alien subterm of t′ wrt the theory =E iff it is not pure wrt
=E:
ast(t′, t,=E)⇔ (t
′
⊏ t) ∧ ¬pure(t′,=E).
We will now describe equational unification.
Definition 3. [Unification Problem, Unifier]
If F is a signature and E is a set of identities, then an E-Unification Problem over F
is a finite set of equations
Γ =
{
s1
?
=E t1, . . . , sn
?
=E tn
}
2Following Lowe [28], we adopt functional programming convention and use an underscore ( ) in a for-
mula, when the value in it doesn’t affect the truthness of the formula.
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between F -terms. A substitution σ is called an E-Unifier for Γ if (∀s ?=E t ∈ Γ)(sσ =E
tσ). UE(Γ) is the set of all E-Unifiers of Γ. A E-Unification Problem is called E-Unifiable
iff UE(Γ) 6= {}.
A complete set of E-Unifiers of an E-Unification Problem Γ is a set C of idempotent
E-Unifiers of Γ such that for each θ ∈ UE(Γ) there exists σ ∈ C with σ ≥E θ, where ≥E
is a partial order on UE(Γ).
An E-Unification Algorithm takes an E-Unification Problem Γ and returns a finite,
complete set of E-Unifiers.
Hence forth, we will abbreviate “Unification Algorithm” to UA and “Unification Prob-
lem” to UP.
Two theories =E1 and =E2 are disjoint if E1 and E2 do not use any common func-
tion symbols. UAs for two disjoint theories may be combined to output the complete set
of unifiers for UPs made with operators from both the theories, using Baader & Schulz
Combination Algorithm (BSCA) [2].
3.2 Protocol Model
We will now introduce our protocol model, which is based on the strand space frame-
work [42].
Definition 4. [Node, Strand, Protocol] A node is a tuple 〈±, t〉 denoted ±t where t ∈
T (F,Vars). A strand is a sequence of nodes. A protocol is a set of strands called “roles”.
Informally, we write +t if a node “sends” term t and −t if it “receives” t. Further, if
〈s, t〉 is a node, then, 〈s, t〉σ = 〈s, tσ〉.
As an example for strands and protocols, consider the NSL⊕ protocol presented in Sec-
tion 2. This protocol that has two roles, roleA and roleB . i.e.,
NSL⊕ = {roleA, roleB},
where
roleA = [+[1, A,NA]pk (B),−[2, NA ⊕B,NB]pk(A),+[3, NB]pk (B)], and
roleB = [−[1, A,NA]pk (B),+[2, NA ⊕B,NB]pk(A),−[3, NB]pk(B)].
We define a function Terms() to return all the terms in the nodes of a strand. If r is a
strand, then,
Terms(r) = {t | 〈 , t〉 in r}.
We will also overload the functions Vars(), Constants(), and SubTerms() that were
previously defined on sets of terms to strands in the obvious way. For instance, if s is a
strand, then,
SubTerms(s) = {t | (∃t′)((t′ ∈ Terms(s)) ∧ (t ⊏ t′))},
Vars(s) = Vars(SubTerms(s)),
Constants(s) = Constants(SubTerms(s)).
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A semi-bundle S for a protocol P is a set of strands formed by applying substitutions
to some of the variables in the strands of P : If P is a protocol, then,
semi-bundle(S, P )⇒ (∀s ∈ S)((∃r ∈ P ; σ)(s = rσ)).
For instance, S = {sa1, sa2, sb1, sb2} below is a semi-bundle for the NSL⊕ protocol with
two strands per role of the protocol:
sa1 = [+[a1, na1]pk(B1),−[na1 ⊕ B1, NB1]pk (A1),+[NB1]pk(B1)],
sa2 = [+[a2, na2]pk(B2),−[na2 ⊕ B2, NB2]pk (A2),+[NB2]pk(B2)],
sb1 = [−[A3, NA3]pk (b1),+[NA3 ⊕ b1, nb1]pk (A3),−[nb1]pk(b1)],
sb2 = [−[A4, NA4]pk (b2),+[NA4 ⊕ b2, nb2]pk (A4),−[nb2]pk(b2)].
(Note: As stated earlier, we use lower-case symbols for constants and upper-case for
variables).
We will assume that every protocol has a set of variables that are considered “fresh
variables” (e.g. Nonces and Session-keys). If P is a protocol, then, FreshVars(P ) denotes
the set of fresh variables in P . We will call the constants substituted to fresh variables of
a protocol in its semi-bundles as “fresh constants” and denote them as FreshCons(S). i.e.,
If semi-bundle(S, P ), then,
FreshCons(S) =
{
x |
(
∃r ∈ P ; s ∈ S;
σ;X
)(
(rσ = s) ∧ (X ∈ FreshVars(P ))∧
(x = Xσ) ∧ (x ∈ Constants)
) }
.
We assume that some fresh variables are “secret variables” and denote them as SecVars(P ).
We define “SecConstants()” to return “secret constants” that were used to instantiate secret
variables of a protocol: If semi-bundle(S, P ), then,
SecConstants(S) =
{
x |
(
∃r ∈ P ; s ∈ S;
σ;X
)(
(rσ = s) ∧ (X ∈ SecVars(P ))∧
(x = Xσ) ∧ (x ∈ Constants)
) }
.
For instance, NA andNB are secret variables in the NSL⊕ protocol and na1, na2, nb1, nb2
are the secret constants for its semi-bundle above.
We will lift the functions Vars(), Constants(), SubTerms(), and Terms() that were
previously defined on sets of terms and strands, to sets of strands. For instance, if S is a set
of strands, then,
SubTerms(S) = {t | (∃x ∈ S)(t ∈ SubTerms(x))},
Constants(S) = Constants(SubTerms(S)),
Vars(S) = Vars(SubTerms(S)),
Terms(S) = {t | (∃s ∈ S)(t ∈ Terms(s))}.
We denote the long-term shared-keys of a protocol P as LTKeys(P ), where,
LTKeys(P ) = {x | (∃A,B)((x = sh(A,B)) ∧ (x ∈ SubTerms(P )))}.
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To achieve our main results, we need to make some assumptions. Most of our as-
sumptions are reasonable, not too restrictive for protocol design and in fact, good design
practices that improve security.
Before we start off with our first assumption, we will define a predicate well-typed() on
substitutions such that a substitution is said to be well-typed, if the type of the variable is
the same as that of the term it is substituted for:
(∀t ∈ T (F,Vars);X ∈ Vars)((well-typed(t/X)⇐⇒ (type(t) = type(X)))).
We extend well-typed() on sets of substitutions such that a set of substitutions is well-
typed if all its elements are well-typed:
(∀σ)(well-typed(σ)⇐⇒ (∀t/X ∈ σ)(well-typed(t/X))).
We will now use this predicate to describe our first assumption which states that the
substitutions that are used on roles to form semi-strands, are always well-typed. This as-
sumption is needed to achieve our result on type-flaw attacks.
Assumption 1. (Honest agent substitutions are always well-typed)
If σ is a set of substitutions that was used on a role to form a semi-strand, then σ is
well-typed:
(∀σ)(semi-bundle(S, ) ∧ ( σ ∈ S)⇒ well-typed(σ)).
As noted in [14], for protocol composition or independence to hold, we first need an
assumption that long-term shared-keys are never sent as part of the payload of messages in
protocols, but only used as encryption keys. Obviously, this is a prudent and secure design
principle.
Without this assumption, there could be multi-protocol attacks even when Guttman-
Thayer suggestion of tagging encryptions is followed. For instance, consider the following
protocols:
P1 P2
1. a→ s : sh(a, s) 1. a→ b : [1, na]sh(a,s)
Now the message in the second protocol could be decrypted with sh(a, s) and na could
be derived from it, when it is run with the first protocol.
To formalize this assumption, we define a relation interm denoted⋐ on terms such that,
a term t is an interm of t′ if it is a subterm of t′, but does not appear as an encryption key
or inside a hash or a private-key signature. Formally,
• t ⋐ t′ if t = t′,
• t ⋐ [t1, . . . , tn] if (t ⋐ t1 ∨ . . . ∨ t ⋐ tn),
• t ⋐ [t′]k if (t ⋐ t′),
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• t ⋐ t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn if (t ⋐ t1) ∨ . . . ∨ (t ⋐ tn).
Notice that an interm is also a subterm, but a subterm is not necessarily an interm. For
instance, na is an interm and a subterm of na ⊕ [a]→nb , while nb is a subterm, but not an
interm.
Interms are useful in referring to the plain text of encryptions and in general, the “pay-
load” of messages. i.e., everything that can be “read” by the recipient of a term. Contrast
these with the keys of encrypted terms, which can only be confirmed by decrypting with
the corresponding inverses, but cannot be read (unless included in the plain-text).
Assumption 2. If P is a protocol, then, there is no term of P with a long-term key as an
interm:
(∀t ∈ SubTerms(P ))((∄t′ ⋐ t)(t′ ∈ LTKeys(P ))).
It turns out that this assumption is not sufficient. As noted by an anonymous reviewer
of a workshop version of this paper [30], we also need another assumption that if a variable
is used as a subterm of a key, then there should be no message in which that variable is sent
in plain (since a long-term shared-key could be substituted to the variable as a way around
the previous assumption).
Hence, we state our next assumption as follows:
Assumption 3. If [t]k is a subterm of a protocol, then no variable of k is an interm of the
protocol:
(∀[t]k ∈ SubTerms(P ))(∄X ⋐ k; t
′ ∈ SubTerms(P ))

 (t′ 6= k)∧(X ∈ Vars)∧
(X ⋐ t′)

 .
Next, we will make some assumptions on the initial intruder knowledge. We will denote
the set of terms known to the intruder before protocols are run, IIK . We will first formalize
the assumption that he knows the public-keys of all the agents:
Assumption 4. (∀x ∈ Constants)(pk(x) ∈ IIK ).
In addition, we will also assume that the attacker knows the values of all the constants
that were substituted by honest agents for all the non-fresh variables (e.g. agent identities
a, b etc.), when they form semi-strands:
Assumption 5. Let P be a protocol. Then,
(∀x/X ∈ σ; r ∈ P )
((
semi-bundle(S, P ) ∧ (rσ ∈ S)∧
(x ∈ Constants) ∧ (X /∈ FreshVars(P ))
)
⇒ (x ∈ IIK )
)
.
Finally, we make another conventional assumption about protocols, namely that honest
agents do not reuse fresh values such as nonces and session-keys:
Assumption 6. Let S1, S2 be two different semi-bundles. Then,
FreshCons(S1) ∩ FreshCons(S2) = {}.
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3.3 Constraints and Satisfiability
In this section, we will formalize the concepts of generating symbolic constraints from
node interleavings of semi-bundles and also the application of symbolic reduction rules to
determine satisfiability of those constraints. These concepts are derived from the works of
Millen-Shmatikov [37] and Chevalier [5], who later extended Millen-Shmatikov’s model
with the XOR operator.
Formalizing constraint satisfiability allows us to rigorously model and reason about
protocol executions and the security properties held within the executions: A satisfiable
constraint sequence leads to a substitution when rules are applied on it and the substitution
can be applied on protocols to generate protocol executions.
Definition 5. [Constraints, Constraint sequences]
A constraint is a tuple 〈m, T 〉 denoted m : T , where m is a term called the target and
T is a set of terms, called the term set:
constraint(〈m, T 〉)⇒ (m ∈ T (F,Vars)) ∧ (T ∈ P(T (F,Vars))).
A constraint sequence is a sequence of constraints. A constraint sequence is from a
semi-bundle if its targets and terms in term sets belong to strands in the semi-bundle. i.e.,
If S is a semi-bundle, then, cs is a constraint sequence of S, or
conseq(cs, S) if
(a) every target in cs is from a ‘−’ node of a strand in S:
(∀m : T in cs)((∃s ∈ S;n in s)(n = −m)).
(b) every term in every term set of cs is from a ‘+’ node of a strand in S:
(∀m : T in cs; t ∈ T )((∃s ∈ S;n in s)(n = +t)).
A “simple” constraint is a constraint whose target term is a variable. i.e., A constraint
m : T is simple if m is a variable:
simple(m : T )⇒ (m ∈ Vars).
A “simple” constraint sequence is a sequence with all simple constraints. i.e., If cs is a
constraint sequence, then,
simple(cs)⇒ (∀c in cs)(simple(c)).
The “active constraint” of a constraint sequence is the constraint in the sequence whose
prior constraints are all simple constraints:
active(c, cs)⇒ ((c in cs) ∧ (∀c′ in cs)((c′ ≺cs c)⇒ simple(c
′))).
13
concat [t1, . . . , tn] : T t1 : T ,. . . ,tn : T split t : T ∪ [t1, . . . , tn] t : T ∪ t1 ∪ . . . ∪ tn
penc [m]→k : T k : T,m : T pdec m : [t]
→
pk (ǫ) ∪ T m : t ∪ T
senc [m]↔k : T k : T,m : T sdec m : [t]
↔
k ∪ T k : T,m : T ∪ {t, k}
sig sigk(t) : T t : T hash h(t) : T t : T
xorr m : T∪ t2 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn : T, xorl t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn : T t2 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn : T ,
t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn m : T ∪ t1 t1 : T
Table 1: Set of reduction rules, Rules
We denote the sequence of constraints before the active constraint c of a constraint
sequence cs as cs< and those after c as cs>. i.e.,
cs = cs⌢< c
⌢cs>.
if active(c, cs) is true, where ⌢ is the sequence concatenation operator.
Next, we define some symbolic reduction rules that can be applied on the active con-
straint of a constraint sequence. We name the set of all such rules as Rules where
Rules = {un, ksub, join, split, senc, penc, sdec, pdec, hash, sig, xorl, xorr}.
Before defining the rules, we will explain a notation. If c = m : T is a constraint and τ
is a set of substitutions, then,
cτ = mτ : Tτ.
In Table 1, we define Rules , that can be applied on the active constraint of a constraint
sequence.
The first column is the name of the rule, the second and third columns are the active
constraints before and after the application of the rule.
We define a predicate applicable() on each of these rules, that is true if the rule under
consideration is applicable on the active constraint of the given constraint sequence. The
predicate takes the name of the rule, the input sequence cs, the output sequence cs′, input
substitution σ, output substitution σ′, and the theory Th considered as arguments. For
instance, we define xorr as follows:
applicable(xorr, cs, cs
′, σ, σ′,Th)⇔ (∃m, T, t)
(
active(m : T ∪ t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn, cs) ∧ (σ
′ = σ)∧
(cs′ = cs⌢< [t2 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn : T,m : T ∪ t1]
⌢cs>)
)
Note that we did not use brackets {} for singleton sets, to avoid notational clutter. For
instance, we write m : T ∪ t1, instead of m : T ∪ {t1} since it is unambiguous.
We left out two important rules in the table, un and ksub, that are the only rules that
change the attacker substitution through unification. We describe them next:
applicable(un, cs, cs′, σ, σ′,=E)⇔ (∃m, T, t)
(
active(m : T ∪ t, cs) ∧ (cs′ = cs<τ
⌢cs>τ)∧
(σ′ = σ ∪ τ) ∧ (τ ∈ UE({m
?
=E t}))
)
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applicable(ksub, cs, cs′, σ, σ′,=E)⇔ (∃m, T, t)

 active(m : T ∪ [t]
→
k , cs)∧
(cs′ = cs<τ
⌢[mτ : Tτ ∪ [t]→k τ ]
⌢cs>τ)∧
(σ′ = σ ∪ τ) ∧ (τ ∈ UE({k
?
=E pk(ǫ)}))


(Note: ǫ is a constant of type Agent , representing the name of the attacker, always
belonging to IIK ).
We will say that a constraint sequence cs′ is a child constraint sequence of another
sequence cs, if it can be obtained after applying some reduction rules on cs in the theory
Th:
childseq(cs, cs′,Th)⇔ (∃r1, . . . , rn ∈ Rules)

 applicable(r1, cs, cs1, σ, σ1,Th)∧applicable(r2, cs1, cs2, σ1, σ2,Th) ∧ . . .∧
applicable(rn, csn−1, cs
′, σn−1, σn,Th)

 .
We now define “normal” constraint sequences, where the active constraint does not
have sequences on the target or in the term set and has stand-alone variables in the term set
(also recall that by definition, the target term of an active constraint is not a variable):
normal(cs)⇔


active(m : T, cs)∧
(∄t1, . . . , tn)([t1, . . . , tn] = m)∧
((∀t ∈ T )((∄t1, . . . , tn)([t1, . . . , tn] = t))∧
(∀t ∈ T )(t /∈ Vars))


Next, we will define a recursive function, normalize(), that maps constraints to con-
straint sequences such that:
normalize(m : T ) = [m : T ], if normal(m : T );
= normalize(t1 : T )
⌢ . . .⌢ normalize(tn : T ) if m = [t1, . . . , tn];
= normalize(m : T ′ ∪ t1 ∪ . . . ∪ tn) if T = T ′ ∪ [t1, . . . , tn].
We will now overload this function to apply it on constraint sequences as well:
normalize(cs) = cs, if normal(cs)
= cs⌢< normalize(c)
⌢cs>, if active(c, cs).
We define satisfiability of constraints as a predicate “satisfiable” which is true if there
is a sequence of applicable rules which reduce a given normal constraint sequence cs to a
simple constraint sequence csn, in a theory Th, resulting in a substitution σn:
satisfiable(cs, σn,Th)⇒
(∃r1, . . . , rn ∈ Rules)


applicable(r1, cs, cs1, {}, σ1,Th)∧
applicable(r2, cs
′
1, cs2, σ1, σ2,Th) ∧ . . .∧
applicable(rn, cs
′
n−1, csn, σn−1, σn,Th)∧
simple(csn)∧
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(cs′i = normalize(csi))

 .
(1)
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Notice the last clause which requires that every constraint sequence be normalized be-
fore any rule is applied, when checking for satisfiability.
This definition of satisfiability may seem unusual, especially for the puritans, since
satisfiability is usually defined using attacker capabilities as operators on sets of ground
terms to generate each target on constraints.
However, it was proven in [5] that the decision procedure on which our definition is
based, is sound and complete with respect to attacker capabilities on ground terms in the
presence of the algebraic properties of XOR. Hence, we defined it directly in terms of the
decision procedure, since we will be using only that to prove our main theorem. We refer
the interested reader to [37] and [5] for more details on the underlying attacker operators,
whose usage is equated to the decision procedure that we have used.
Note also that our definition only captures completeness of the decision procedure wrt
satisfiability, not soundness, since that is the only aspect we need for our proofs in this
paper.
3.4 Security properties and attacks
Every security protocol is designed to achieve certain goals (e.g. secure key establishment,
authentication). Correspondingly, every execution of a protocol is expected to satisfy some
security properties. For instance, a key establishment protocol should not leak the key
being established, which would be a violation of secrecy. Similarly, a key establishment
protocol should not lead an honest agent to exchange a key with an attacker which would
be a violation of both secrecy and authentication.
Security properties such as secrecy can be tested if they hold on executions of pro-
tocols, by forming semi-bundles of the protocols, forming constraint sequences from the
semi-bundles, adding the desired property to be tested to the constraint sequences and then
checking if the resulting constraint sequence is satisfiable.
For instance, consider the following constraint sequence from a semi-bundle of the
NSL⊕ protocol:
[1, NA, A]pk (b) : [1, na, a]pk (B) ∪ IIK (= T1)
[2, na ⊕B,NB]pk(a) : [2, NA ⊕ b, nb]pk(A) ∪ T1 (= T2)
[3, nb]pk (b) : [3, NB]pk (B) ∪ T2
nb : T2.
The first three constraints are obtained from a semi-bundle with one strand per role of
the NSL⊕ protocol. The last constraint is an artificial constraint added to them, to test if
secrecy is violated in the sequence.
If the constraint sequence is solved by applying the rules previously defined, it shows
that the nonce nb, which is supposedly secret, can be obtained by the attacker by interleav-
ing the messages of honest agents a and b. Specifically, we would apply penc to the first
constraint, and split it into [1, NA, A] : T1 and pk(b) : T1. We would then apply pair to
split the former into three constraints: 1 : T1, NA : T1, and A : T1. Next, rule un is applied
on the second constraint, unifying terms [2, na ⊕ B,NB]pk (a) and [2, NA ⊕ b, nb]pk(A). The
resulting unifier {na⊕b⊕i/NA, ǫ/B, nb/NB}, is applied on the term in the third constraint,
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[3, NB]pk (B), making it [3, nb]pk (ǫ). Finally, nb can be extracted from this term using pdec
and pair, satisfying the last constraint.
Our definition of type-flaw attacks is general, and is valid for any property such as se-
crecy that can be tested on satisfiable constraint sequences from semi-bundles of protocols.
Definition 6. [Type-flaw attack]
A protocol has a type-flaw attack in the theory Th iff there exists a semi-bundle from
the protocol that has a constraint sequence satisfiable only with a substitution that is not
well-typed: i.e., if P is a protocol, then:
(∀cs, S)

 semi-bundle(S, P ) ∧ conseq(cs, S)∧(∃σ)(satisfiable(cs, σ,Th) ∧ ¬well-typed(σ))∧
(∄σ′)(satisfiable(cs, σ′,Th) ∧ well-typed(σ′))

⇔ typeFlawAttack(P,Th).
While our result on type-flaw attack is general and valid for any trace property, we
achieve our other result on multi-protocol attacks in the context of secrecy (extensible to
other properties such as authentication). Accordingly, we provide a definition for the prop-
erty below.
Definition 7. [Secrecy]
A protocol is secure for secrecy in the theory Th, if no constraint sequence from semi-
bundles of the protocol is satisfiable, after a constraint with its target as a secret constant
of the semi-bundle and its term set as the term set of the last constraint of the sequence is
added as the last constraint of the sequence. i.e., if P is a protocol, then,
secureForSecrecy(P,Th)⇔ (∄sec, cs, S)


semi-bundle(S, P ) ∧ conseq(cs, S)∧
(cs = [ : , . . . , : T ])∧
(sec ∈ SecConstants(S))∧
satisfiable(cs⌢[sec : T ], σ,Th)

 .
3.5 Main Requirements – NUT and µ-NUT
We now formulate our main requirements on protocol messages to prevent all type-flaw and
multi-protocol attacks in the =S∪A theory3. The requirements are slight variations of the
suggestions by Heather et al. and Guttman et al., who suggest inserting distinct component
numbers inside encryptions. In a symbolic model, such component numbering guarantees
NUT (Non-Unifiability of encrypted Terms).
We will first define a function EncSubt() that returns all the encrypted subterms of a
term4:
EncSubt : T (F,Vars)→ P(T (F,Vars))
where, if m is a term, then, EncSubt(m) is the set of all terms such that if t belongs to
the set, then t must be a subterm of m and is an encryption, hash or signature:
3S ∪ A is an abbreviation for STD ∪ ACUN.
4P(X) is the power-set of the set X .
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EncSubt(m) =

 t | (∃t′, k′ ∈ T (F,Vars))

 (t ⊏ m)∧((t = [t′]→k′ ) ∨ (t = [t′]↔k′ )∨
(t = h(t′)) ∨ (t = sigk′(t
′)))



 .
Further, if S is a set of strands, then, it’s encrypted subterms are the encryptions of it’s
subterms:
EncSubt(S) = {t | (∃t′)((t′ ∈ SubTerms(S)) ∧ (t ∈ EncSubt(t′)))}.
Definition 8. [NUT]
A protocol P is NUT-Satisfying , i.e.,
NUT-Satisfying(P ) iff
(a) An encrypted subterm of the protocol is not STD-Unifiable with any other non-
variable subterm of the protocol:
(∀t1, t2)




(t2 /∈ Vars)∧
(t1 ∈ EncSubt(P ))∧
(t2 ∈ SubTerms(P ))∧
(t1 6= t2)

⇒ ((∀σ1, σ2)(USTD(t1σ1, t2σ2) = {}))

 .
(b) A key used in an asymmetric encryption is not a free variable:
(∀t ∈ EncSubt(P ))
(
(∃t′, k)((t = [t′]→k )⇒ (k /∈ Vars))
)
.
(c) If an XOR term, say t1⊕ . . .⊕ tn, is a subterm of P , then, no two terms in {t1, . . . , tn}
are STD-Unifiable, unless they are equal:
(∀t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn ∈ SubTerms(P ); t, t
′)
(
(t, t′ ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}) ∧ (t 6= t
′)⇒
(∀σ, σ′)(USTD(tσ, t
′σ′) = {})
)
.
The first requirement can be satisfied by simply inserting distinct component numbers
inside distinct encrypted subterms of a protocol, as was done in the NSL⊕ protocol in
Section 2.
The second requirement can be satisfied by adding a distinct constant to the key of an
asymmetric encryption, if it was a free variable. For instance, [1, NA, B]→K can be trans-
formed into [1, NA, B]→[2,K].
The third requirement can also be satisfied in much the same way as the other two.
We can add a distinct constant to each textually distinct variable inside an XOR term. For
instance, the second message in the original NSL⊕ protocol was
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[2, NA ⊕B,NB]pk(A).
With the number ‘2’ inside this message and numbers ‘1’ and ‘3’ inside the others, the
protocol satisfied the first requirement above, but was still vulnerable to an attack. The
third requirement above requires that the second message be changed to,
[2, [4, NA]⊕ [5, B], NB]pk (A),
that prevents the attack.
Next we deal with multi-protocol environments. Our requirement defined below, namely
µ-NUT, ensures that encrypted terms in different protocols cannot be replayed into one an-
other. The requirement is an extension of Guttman-Thayer’s suggestion to make encrypted
terms distinguishable across protocols, to include XOR as well.
We first define a set XorTerms as:
{t | (∃t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (F,Vars))(t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn = t)}.
We are now ready to state the main requirement formally:
Definition 9. [µ-NUT]
Two protocols P1 and P2 are µ-NUT-Satisfying , i.e., µ-NUT-Satisfying(P1, P2) iff:
1. Encrypted subterms in both protocols are not STD-Unifiable after applying any sub-
stitutions to them:
(∀t1 ∈ EncSubt(P1), t2 ∈ EncSubt(P2))((∀σ1, σ2)(USTD(t1σ1, t2σ2)) = {}).
2. Subterms of XOR-terms of one protocol (that are not XOR-terms themselves), are not
STD-Unifiable with any subterms of XOR-terms of the other protocol (that are not
XOR-terms as well):
(
∀t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn ∈ SubTerms(P1),
t′1 ⊕ . . .⊕ t
′
n ∈ SubTerms(P2); t, t
′
) (t ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}) ∧ (t′ ∈ {t′1, . . . , t′n})(t1, . . . , tn, t′1, . . . , t′n /∈ XorTerms)∧
⇒ (∀σ, σ′)(USTD(tσ, t
′σ′) = {})

 .
The first requirement is the same as Guttman-Thayer suggestion. The second require-
ment extends it to the case of XOR-terms, which is our stated extension in this paper.
The NSL⊕ protocol can be transformed to suit this requirement by tagging its encrypted
messages as follows:
Msg 1. A→ B : [nsl⊕, NA, A]pk (B)
Msg 2. B → A : [nsl⊕, [nsl⊕, NA]⊕ [nsl⊕, B], NB]pk (A)
Msg 3. A→ B : [nsl⊕, NB]pk(B)
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The constant “nsl⊕” inside the encryptions can be encoded using some suitable bit-
encoding when the protocol is implemented. Obviously, other protocols must have their
encrypted subterms start with the names of those protocols.
We will later use this requirement in Section 5.2 to prove that this is sufficient to prevent
all multi-protocol attacks on security protocols, even when they use the XOR operator.
4 Some Lemmas
In this section, we provide some useful lemmas that we will use later in our main theorems.
• In Section 4.1, we prove that if two non-variable StdOps-terms were obtained by
applying two well-typed substitutions for the same term, then the unifier for the two
terms is necessarily well-typed;
• In Section 4.2, we first introduce Baader & Schulz Combination Algorithm (BSCA)
to find unifiers for UPs from two disjoint theories, say =E1 and =E2 [2]. We will then
prove that if the unifier for the E1-UP from a given (E1 ∪ E2)-UP, say Γ, is empty,
then the combined unifier is simply equal to the unifier for the E2-UP from Γ;
• In Section 4.3, we prove that all ACUN-UPs formed by using BSCA on an original
(S ∪ A)-UP that does not have free variables in XOR terms, have only constants as
subterms.
4.1 Well-typed standard terms unify only under well-typed unifiers
In our first lemma, we prove that two StdOps-terms obtained by instantiating the same
StdOps-term, with well-typed substitutions, unify only under a well-typed substitution:
Lemma 1. [Well-typed StdOps-terms unify only under well-typed unifiers]
If t is a non-variable term that is pure wrt =STD theory:
(t /∈ Vars) ∧ pure(t,=STD),
and t1, t2 are two terms that are also pure wrt =STD theory, and obtained by applying
sets of substitutions σ1 and σ2 such that,
t1 = tσ1 and t2 = tσ2,
and σ1, σ2 are well-typed:
well-typed(σ1) ∧ well-typed(σ2),
and every x/X ∈ σ1 ∪ σ2 is such that x is pure wrt =STD:
(∀x/X ∈ σ1 ∪ σ2)(pure(x,=STD)),
then, any unifier for t1 and t2, will be necessarily well-typed:
(∀τ)((t1τ =STD t2τ)⇒ well-typed(τ)).
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Proof. Let t = op(t′1, . . . , t′n) where op ∈ StdOps .
Now,
t1 = tσ1 (from hypothesis),
= op(t′1σ1, . . . , t
′
nσ1) (from Def. 1)
Similarly, t2 = op(t′1σ2, . . . , t′nσ2). Let τ be a set of substitutions. Then, we have that,
(t1τ =STD t2τ)⇔ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(t
′
iσ1τ =STD t
′
iσ2τ).
Without loss of generality, consider
t′1σ1τ =STD t
′
1σ2τ.
Then, since σ1 and σ2 are well-typed, will be well-typed when:
• Both t′1σ1 and t′1σ2 are variables; or
• t′1σ1 is a variable and t′1σ2 is a constant; or
• t′1σ1 is a constant and t′1σ2 is a variable.
For instance, if (t′1σ1 ∈ Vars) s.t. t′1σ1 = X and (t′1σ2 ∈ Constants) s.t. t′1σ2 = y,
then, since well-typed(σ1) and well-typed(σ2), we have,
type(t′1) = type(X) = type(y).
and well-typed(y/X).
Thus, we conclude:

 ((t′1σ1, t′1σ2 ∈ Vars)∨(t′1σ1 ∈ Constants ; t′1σ2 ∈ Vars)∨
(t′1σ1 ∈ Vars ; t
′
1σ2 ∈ Constants))

 ∧ (t′1σ1τ =STD t′1σ2τ)⇒ well-typed(τ) (2)
Given this, let us now assume for the purpose of induction that a unifier for t′1σ1 and
t′1σ2 will be well-typed when both t′1σ1 and t′1σ2 are compound terms. i.e.,
(t′1σ1, t
′
2σ2 /∈ Vars ∪ Constants) ∧ (t
′
1σ1τ =STD t
′
1σ2τ)⇒ well-typed(τ). (3)
Combining (2) and (3), we can conclude that all the unifiers for t′iσ1 and t′iσ2 (i ∈
{1, . . . , n}) are well-typed:
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})((t′iσ1τ =STD t
′
iσ2τ) ⇒ well-typed(τ)).
This implies that our hypothesis is true:
(tσ1τ =STD tσ2τ)⇒ well-typed(τ).
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4.2 Combined unifier when one of the unifier is empty
Our next two lemmas are related to the combined unification of (E1∪E2)-UPs, where =E1
and =E2 are disjoint.
We first define the variables of a UP, Γ, as Vars(Γ), where every element of Vars(Γ) is
a variable and a subterm of a UP in Γ:
Vars(Γ) = {X | (∃s
?
= t ∈ Γ)(((X ⊏ s) ∨ (X ⊏ t)) ∧ (X ∈ Vars))}.
Similarly,
Constants(Γ) = {X | (∃s
?
= t ∈ Γ)(((X ⊏ s) ∨ (X ⊏ t)) ∧ (X ∈ Constants))}.
Further, we will say that term t belongs to a UP, say Γ, even if t is one of the terms of
one of the problems in Γ. i.e.,
(t ∈ Γ)⇔ (∃t′)(t
?
= t′ ∈ Γ).
We will now explain how two UAs AE1 and AE2 for two disjoint theories =E1 and
=E2 respectively, may be combined to output the unifiers for a (E1 ∪E2)-UP using Baader
& Schulz Combination Algorithm (BSCA) [2]. We give a more detailed explanation in
Appendix A.2 using an example UP for the interested reader.
BSCA takes as input a (E1 ∪E2)-UP, say Γ, and applies some transformations on them
to derive Γ5.1 and Γ5.2 that are sets of E1-UP and E2-UPs respectively. We outline the steps
in this process below (we formalize these steps directly in Lemma 3 where we use BSCA
in detail):
Step 1 (Purify terms) BSCA first “purifies” the given (E = E1 ∪ E2)-UP, Γ, into a new
UP, Γ1, with the introduction of some new variables, such that, all the terms are “pure” wrt
=E1 or =E2 .
Step 2. (Purify problems) Next, BSCA purifies Γ1 into Γ2 such that, every UP in Γ2 has
both terms pure wrt the same theory, =E1 or =E2 .
Step 3. (Variable identification) Next, BSCA partitionsVars(Γ2) into a partitionVarIdP
such that, each variable in Γ2 is replaced with a representative from the same equivalence
class in VarIdP . The result is Γ3.
Step 4. (Split the problem) The next step of BSCA is to split Γ3 into two UPs Γ4.1
and Γ4.2 such that, each set has every problem with terms that are pure wrt =E1 or =E2
respectively.
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Step 5. (Solve systems) The penultimate step of BSCA is to partition all the variables
in Γ3 into a size of two: Let p = {V1, V2} is a partition of Vars(Γ3). Then, the earlier
problems (Γ4.1, Γ4.2) are further split such that, all the variables in one set of the partition
are replaced with new constants in the other set and vice-versa. The resulting sets are Γ5.1
and Γ5.2.
Step 6. (Combine unifiers) The final step of BSCA is to combine the unifiers for Γ5.1
and Γ5.2, obtained using AE1 and AE2 :
Definition 10. [Combined Unifier]
Let Γ be a E-UP where (E1 ∪ E2) = E. Let σi ∈ AEi(Γ5.i), i ∈ {1, 2} and let
Vi = Vars(Γ5.i), i ∈ {1, 2}.
Suppose ‘<’ is a linear order on Vars(Γ) such that Y < X if X is not a subterm of an
instantiation of Y :
(∀X, Y ∈ Vars(Γ))((Y < X)⇒ ( 6 ∃σ)(X ⊏ Y σ)).
Let least(X, T,<) be defined as the minimal element of set T , when ordered linearly by
the relation ‘<’. i.e.,
least(X, T,<)⇔ (∀Y ∈ T )((Y 6= X)⇒ (X < Y )).
Then, the combined UA for Γ, namely AE1∪E2 , is defined such that,
AE1∪E2(Γ) = {σ | (∃σ1, σ2)((σ = σ1 ⊙ σ2) ∧ (σ1 ∈ AE1(Γ5.1)) ∧ (σ2 ∈ AE2(Γ5.2)))}.
where, if σ = σ1 ⊙ σ2, then,
• The substitution in σ for the least variable in V1 and V2 is from σ1 and σ2 respectively:
(∀i ∈ {1, 2})((X ∈ Vi) ∧ least(X,Vars(Γ), <)⇒ (Xσ = Xσi)); and
• For all other variables X , where each Y with Y < X has a substitution already
defined, define Xσ = Xσiσ (i ∈ {1, 2}):
(∀i ∈ {1, 2})((∀X ∈ Vi)((∀Y )((Y < X) ∧ (∃Z)(Z/Y ∈ σ)))⇒ (Xσ = Xσiσ)).
It has been proven in [2] that the combination algorithm defined above is a (E1 ∪ E2)-
UA for any (E1 ∪ E2)-UP if E1-UA and E2-UA are known to exist and if =E1 , =E2 are
disjoint. The combination of STD and ACUN UAs which is of interest to us in this paper
has been explained to be finitary (i.e., return a finite number of unifiers) when combined
using BSCA [43].
We now prove a simple lemma which states that the combined unifier of two unifiers is
equal to one of the unifiers, if the other unifier is empty.
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Lemma 2. [Combined unifier when one of the unifier is empty]
Let Γ, σ, σ1, σ2, V1, V2, and < be as defined above in Def. 10. Then,
(σ = σ1 ⊙ σ2) ∧ (σ2 = {}) ∧ (V2 = {})⇒ (σ = σ1).
Proof. Let Vars(σ) = {X | /X ∈ σ}.
From Def. 10, if σ = σ1 ⊙ σ2, then,
(∀i ∈ {1, 2})((X ∈ Vi) ∧ least(X,Vars(Γ), <)⇒ (Xσ = Xσi)).
But since σ2 = {} and V2 = {}, we have,
(∀X ∈ V1 ∪ V2)(least(X,Vars(Γ), <)⇒ (Xσ = Xσ1)). (4)
Also from Def. 10,
(∀X ∈ V1 ∪ V2)((∀Y )((Y < X) ∧ (∃Z)(Z/Y ∈ σ)⇒ (Xσ = Xσiσ))).
Again, since σ2 = {} and V2 = {}, this implies,
(∀X ∈ V1 ∪ V2)((∀Y )((Y < X) ∧ (∃Z)(Z/Y ∈ σ)⇒ (Xσ = Xσ1))). (5)
Combining (4) and (5), we have,
(∀X ∈ V1 ∪ V2)(Xσ = Xσ1). (6)
Further, since σ2 = {}, and V2 = {}, we have Vars(σ) = Vars(σ1) = V1 and hence,
combining this with (6), we have σ = σ1.
4.3 ACUN-UPs in NUT-Satisfying protocols have only constants as
subterms
Our next lemma is a bit lengthy. This lemma is the lynchpin of the paper and forms the
crux of our two main theorems in Section 5.
It concerns combined UPs involving the disjoint theories, =STD and =ACUN. We prove
that, if we follow BSCA for finding unifiers for a (S ∪ A)-UP, say Γ, that do not have
free variables inside XOR terms, the terms in all the ACUN-UPs (Γ5.2) from those will
always have only constants as subterms. Consequently, we will end up in an empty set of
substitutions returned by the ACUN-UA for Γ5.2, even when their terms are equal in the
=ACUN theory.
Lemma 3. [ACUN-UPs have only constants as subterms]
Let Γ = {m ?=S∪A t} be a (S ∪ A)-UP that is (S ∪ A)-Unifiable, and where no subterm
of m or t is an XOR term with free variables:
24
(∀x)
(
((x ⊏ m) ∨ (x ⊏ t)) ∧ (n ∈ N)
(x = x1 ⊕ . . .⊕ xn) ∧ (n > 1)
⇒ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(xi /∈ Vars)
)
.
Then,
(∀m′
?
=ACUN t
′ ∈ Γ5.2; x)
(
(x ⊏ m′) ∨ (x ⊏ t′) ⇒ (x ∈ Constants)
)
.
Proof. Let σ be a set of substitutions s.t. σ ∈ AS∪A(Γ).
Then, from Def. 10 (Combined Unifier), σ ∈ σ1 ⊙ σ2, where σ1 ∈ ASTD(Γ5.1) and
σ2 ∈ AACUN(Γ5.2).
Suppose there is a term t in Γ with an alien subterm t′ wrt the theory =ACUN (e.g.
[1, na]
→
k ⊕ b⊕ c with the alien subterm of [1, na]→k ).
Then, from the definition of Γ2, it must have been replaced with a new variable in Γ2.
i.e.,
(∀t, t′)
((
(t ∈ Γ) ∧ (t = ⊕ . . .⊕ )∧
(t′ ⊏ t) ∧ ast(t′, t,=ACUN)
)
⇒ (∃X)
(
(X
?
=STD t
′ ∈ Γ2)∧
(X ∈ NewVars)
))
. (7)
where NewVars ⊂ Vars \ Vars(Γ).
Since XOR terms do not have free variables from hypothesis, it implies that every free
variable in an XOR term in Γ2 is a new variable:
(∀t, t′)
((
(t ∈ Γ2) ∧ pure(t,=ACUN)∧
(t′ ⊏ t) ∧ (t′ ∈ Vars)
)
⇒ (t′ ∈ NewVars)
)
. (8)
Since every alien subterm of every term in Γ has been replaced with a new variable (7),
combining it with (8), XOR terms in Γ2 must now have only constants and/or new variables
as subterms:
(∀t, t′)
((
pure(t,=ACUN)∧
(t ∈ Γ2) ∧ (t
′
⊏ t)
)
⇒ (t′ ∈ NewVars ∪ Constants)
)
. (9)
Let VarIdP be a partition of Vars(Γ2) and Γ3 = Γ2ρ, such that
Γ2ρ = {s
?
= p | (s
?
= p := s′ρ
?
= t′ρ) ∧ s′
?
= t′ ∈ Γ}
where ρ is the set of substitutions where each set of variables in VarIdP has been
replaced with one of the variables in the set:
ρ =

 x/X |

 (∀Y1/X1, Y2/X2 ∈ ρ; vip ∈ VarIdP)

 (X1, X2 ∈ vip)⇒(Y1 = Y2)∧
(Y1, Y2 ∈ vip)





 .
Can there exist a substitution X/Y in ρ such that Y ∈ NewVars and X ∈ Vars(Γ)?
To find out, consider the following two statements:
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• From (7), every new variable Y in Γ2 belongs to a STD-UP in Γ2:
(∀Y ∈ NewVars)((Y ∈ Vars(Γ2)⇒ (∃t)(pure(t,=STD) ∧ Y
?
=STD t ∈ Γ2))).
• Further, from hypothesis, we have that XOR terms in Γ do not have free variables.
Hence, every free variable is a proper subterm5 of a purely =STD term:
(∀X ∈ Vars(Γ))
(
(∃t ∈ Γ)((X ⊏ t) ∧ pure(t,=STD) ∧ (X 6= t))
)
.
The above two statements are contradictory: It is not possible that a new variable and
an existing variable can be replaced with each other, since one belongs to a STD-UP, and
another is always a proper subterm of a term that belongs to a STD-UP.
Hence, VarIdP cannot consist of sets where new variables are replaced by Vars(Γ).
i.e.,
(∄X, Y ; vip ∈ VarIdP)
(
(Y,X ∈ vip) ∧ (Y ∈ NewVars)∧
(X ∈ Vars(Γ)) ∧ (X/Y ∈ ρ)
)
(10)
Writing (10) in (9), we have,
(∀t, t′)
((
pure(t,=ACUN)∧
(t ∈ Γ3) ∧ (t
′
⊏ t)
)
⇒ (t′ ∈ NewVars ∪ Constants)
)
. (11)
Further, if a variable belongs to a UP of Γ3, then the other term of the UP is pure wrt
=STD theory:
(∀X ∈ Vars(Γ3), t)
((
(X
?
=STD t ∈ Γ3)∨
(t
?
=STD X ∈ Γ3)
)
⇒ (X ∈ NewVars) ∧ pure(t,=STD)
)
.
(12)
Now suppose Γ4.2 = {s
?
= t | (s
?
= t ∈ Γ3) ∧ pure(s,=ACUN) ∧ pure(t,=ACUN)},
{V1, V2} a partition of Vars(Γ) ∪ NewVars , and
Γ5.2 = Γ4.2β,
where, β is a set of substitutions of new constants to V1:
β = {x/X | (X ∈ V1) ∧ (x ∈ Constants \ (Constants(Γ) ∪ Constants(Γ5.1)))}.
From hypothesis, Γ5.2 is ACUN-Unifiable. Hence, we have:
(∀σ)((∀m′
?
=ACUN t
′ ∈ Γ5.2)(m
′σ =ACUN t
′σ)⇔ σ ∈ AACUN(Γ5.2)).
Now consider a σ s.t. σ ∈ AACUN(Γ5.2).
5
t is a proper subterm of t′ if t ⊏ t′ ∧ t 6= t′.
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From (11), we have that XOR terms in Γ5.2 have only new variables and/or constants
and from (12) we have that if X ∈ Vars(Γ5.2), then there exists t s.t. X ?=STD t ∈ Γ5.1 and
t is pure wrt =STD theory.
Suppose V2 6= {}. Then, there is at least one variable, say X ∈ Vars(Γ5.2). This
implies that X is replaced with a constant (say x) in Γ5.1.
Since X is necessarily a new variable and one term of a STD-UP, this implies that x
must equal some compound term made with StdOps .
However, a compound term made with StdOps can never equal a constant under the
=STD theory:
( 6 ∃op ∈ StdOps ; t1, . . . , tn; x ∈ Constants)(x =STD op(t1, . . . , tn)),
a contradiction.
Hence, σ = {}, V2 = {} and our hypothesis is true that all XOR terms in Γ5.2 necessarily
contain only constants:
(∀m′
?
=ACUN t
′ ∈ Γ5.2; x)
(
(x ⊏ m) ∨ (x ⊏ t)⇒ (x ∈ Constants)
)
.
5 Main Results
In this section, we will prove our main results. We will first prove that NUT-Satisfying pro-
tocols are not susceptible to type-flaw attacks in Section 5.1. We will then prove that
µ-NUT-Satisfying protocols are not susceptible to multi-protocol attacks in Section 5.2.
5.1 NUT prevents type-flaw attacks
We will now prove our first main result that NUT-Satisfying protocols will not have any
type-flaw attacks. The main idea is to show that every unification when solving a constraint
sequence from a NUT-Satisfying protocol results in a well-typed unifier. We follow the
outline below:
1. We will first establish that normal constraint sequences from NUT-Satisfying proto-
cols do not contain variables in the target or term set of their active constraints (either
freely or inside XOR terms), but only subterms of the initial term set;
2. We then infer from Lemma 3 that if a (S∪A)-UP, say Γ, does not have free variables
inside XOR terms, then terms in it’s Γ5.2 will have only constants as subterms;
3. Next, we infer in Lemma 1 that UPs in Γ5.1 unify only under well-typed substitutions,
if they were created from the same underlying term of the protocol, by applying
two well-typed substitutions (which is true for semi-bundles from NUT-Satisfying
protocols, under Assumption 1);
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4. Finally, the combined unifier for Γ is simply the unifier for Γ5.1, from Lemma 2
(Combined unifier when one of the unifier is empty), and hence is always well-
typed.
Theorem 1. NUT-Satisfying protocols are secure against type-flaw attacks in the =S∪A
theory.
Proof. From Def. 6 (type-flaw attacks), a protocol is susceptible to type-flaw attacks if a
constraint sequence from a semi-bundle of the protocol is satisfiable only with a substitution
that is not well-typed.
We will show that this never happens; i.e., every satisfiable constraint sequence from a
semi-bundle of a NUT-Satisfying protocol is satisfiable only with a well-typed substitution.
Let P be a NUT-Satisfying protocol, S a semi-bundle from P , and cs a constraint
sequence from S. Suppose cs is satisfiable with a substitution in the =S∪A theory. i.e.,
semi-bundle(S, P ) ∧ conseq(cs, S) ∧ satisfiable(cs, ,=S∪A). (13)
From (1) (satisfiability), suppose we have r1, . . . , rn ∈ Rules s.t.

applicable(r1, cs, cs1, {}, σ1,=S∪A)∧
applicable(r2, cs
′
1, cs2, σ1, σ2,=S∪A) ∧ . . .
applicable(rn, cs
′
n−1, csn, σn−1, σn,=S∪A)∧
simple(csn)∧
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(cs′i = normalize(csi))

 . (14)
Now every cs′i in (14) is normalized. Hence, their active constraints do not have vari-
ables in the targets or term sets. Further, since P is NUT-Satisfying , no term of the form
t1⊕. . .⊕tp (p > 1) can have a free variable in the set {t1, . . . , tp} (from NUT Condition 3).
i.e.,
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; x)

 active(m : T, cs′i) ∧ (p > 1)(x = m) ∨ (x ∈ {t1, . . . , tp})∧
(t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tp ∈ m ∪ T )

⇒ ( (x /∈ Vars(S))∧
(x ∈ SubTerms(Sσi))
)
.
(15)
From the set Rules it is clear that only un and ksub potentially change the set of substi-
tutions, when applied to a constraint sequence. i.e.,
(∀r ∈ Rules)(applicable(r, , , σ, σ′, ) ∧ (σ ⊂ σ′)⇒ (r = un) ∨ (r = ksub)). (16)
Consider rules un and ksub:
applicable(un, cs, cs′, σ, σ′,=S∪A)⇔ (∃m, T, t)
(
active(m : T ∪ t, cs) ∧ (cs′ = cs<τ
⌢cs>τ)∧
(σ′ = σ ∪ τ) ∧ (τ ∈ US∪A({m
?
=S∪A t}))
)
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applicable(ksub, cs, cs′, σ, σ′,=S∪A)⇔ (∃m, T, t)

 active(m : T ∪ [t]
→
k , cs)∧
(cs′ = cs<τ
⌢[mτ : Tτ ∪ [t]→k τ ]
⌢cs>τ)∧
(σ′ = σ ∪ τ) ∧ (τ ∈ US∪A({k
?
=S∪A pk(ǫ)}))


Suppose Γ = {m ?=S∪A t} where m = m′σmσ and t = t′σtσ and for some r, r′ ∈ P ,
rσm, rσt ∈ S.
Suppose τ ∈ US∪A(Γ). Then, using Def. 10 (Combined Unifier), let τ ∈ τSTD⊙ τACUN
where τSTD ∈ ASTD(Γ5.1) and τACUN ∈ AACUN(Γ5.2).
From (15), we can infer that the conditions of Lemma 3 (ACUN UPs have only con-
stants) are met:
(∀x)
(
((x ⊏ m) ∨ (x ⊏ t))∧
(x = x1 ⊕ . . .⊕ xn) ∧ (n > 1)
)
⇒ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(xi /∈ Vars). (17)
And therefore, we infer from Lemma 3 that:
(∀Γ5.2; τACUN ∈ AACUN(Γ5.2))(τACUN = {}). (18)
Now consider problems in Γ5.1. Suppose 〈m1, t1〉 ∈ Γ5.1. Let m1 = xσmσρα and
t1 = yσtσρα, where σ is as defined in rule un; x, y ∈ SubTerms(P ); ρ as defined in
Lemma 3 and α is a set of substitutions s.t.
Γ5.1 = Γ4.1α,
where, α substitutes new constants to V2:
α = {x/X | (X ∈ Vars(Γ5.2)) ∧ (x ∈ Constants \ Constants(Γ))}.
From Lemma 3, we have that Vars(Γ5.2) = {}. Hence, α = {}.
Also from Lemma 3, we have that, whenever Γ is (S ∪ A)-Unifiable, Γ4.2 will not have
any variables of Γ, and Γ5.2 will not have any variables at all. Hence, we have that every
partition of VarIdP (defined in Lemma 3) in which there is a variable of Γ, has only that
variable and no others in the partition:
(∀vip ∈ VarIdP ;X, Y ∈ vip)(X ∈ Vars(Γ)⇒ X = Y ). (19)
Now, Vars(Γ5.1) = Vars(Γ) ∪ NewVars .
From (19), we have,
(∀x/X ∈ ρ)(X ∈ Vars(Γ)⇒ well-typed(x/X)). (20)
Now,
• From (15), we have that m, t ∈ SubTerms(Sσ);
• From BSCA, if m, t ∈ SubTerms(Sσ), and m1, t1 /∈ NewVars , then m1 and t1 must
belong to SubTerms(Sσρ);
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• From NUT Conditions 1 and 3, if m1 is STD-Unifiable with t1, then x must equal y.
If x = y, since well-typed(σm) and well-typed(σt) from Assumption 1 (Honest agent
substitutions are always well-typed), assumingwell-typed(σ), and well-typed(ρ) from (20),
we can infer from Lemma 1 (Well-typed STD terms unify only under well-typed uni-
fiers) that, well-typed(δ), where m1δ =STD t2δ, if none of NewVars exist as subterms of
m1 or t1:
(∀m1
?
=STD t1 ∈ Γ5.1)
(
(NewVars ∩ SubTerms({m1, t1}) = {})
∧(m1δ =STD t1δ)
⇒ well-typed(δ)
)
.
(21)
But what if m1 or t1 contain new variables as subterms?
Now the type of the new variables is the type of compound terms that they replace:
(∀X ∈ NewVars)(X
?
=ACUN t ∈ Γ2 ⇒ type(X) = type(t)).
Suppose X/Y ∈ ρ, where X, Y ∈ NewVars (note that X or Y cannot belong to
Vars(Γ) from equation (10) in Lemma 3).
Suppose there exist some t1, t2 such that t1
?
=STD X belongs to Γ5.1 and t2
?
=STD Y
belongs to Γ5.1. Suppose t1, t2 do not have any new variables as subterms. Then, from (21),
we have well-typed(θ), where t1θ =STD t2θ, and hence, we have well-typed(X/Y ):
(∀X, Y ∈ NewVars)((X/Y ∈ ρ)⇒ well-typed(X/Y )). (22)
Combining (20) and (22), we have, well-typed(ρ).
Given this, using induction on terms, we conclude similar to concluding (21) that every
problem in Γ5.1 unifies under a well-typed substitution:
(∀m1
?
=STD t1 ∈ Γ5.1)((m1τSTD =STD t1τSTD)⇒ well-typed(τSTD)).
Now,
τ = τSTD ⊙ τACUN
= τSTD ⊙ {} (from 18)
= τSTD. (from Lemma 2 (Combined unifier when one of the unifier is empty))
Since well-typed(τSTD) from above, this implies, well-typed(τ).
Similarly, for ksub, we can conclude, well-typed(τ), where τ ∈ AS∪A({k
?
=S∪A pk(ǫ)}),
provided k is not a variable, and indeed it is not by NUT Condition 2.
So the only rules that potentially change the substitution (un, ksub) produce well-typed
substitutions. We can apply this in (16) and write:
(∀r ∈ {r1, . . . , rn})
( (
applicable(r, , , σ, σ′,=S∪A)∧
well-typed(σ)
)
⇒ well-typed(σ′)
)
. (23)
Since all other rules except un and ksub do not change the attacker substitution, we can
combine the above statement with (14) and conclude:
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

applicable(r1, cs, cs1, {}, σ1,=S∪A)∧
applicable(r2, cs
′
1, cs2, σ1, σ2,=S∪A) ∧ . . .
applicable(rn, cs
′
n−1, csn, σn−1, σn,=S∪A)∧
simple(csn)∧
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(cs′i = normalize(csi))

⇒ well-typed(σn). (24)
(Note that we concluded well-typed(τSTD) assuming that σ in rule un was well-typed.
Thus, in (24), σ1 is well-typed and inductively, all of σ2, . . . , σn are well-typed).
Finally, we can combine the above statement with (13) and form:
(∀cs, S, σ)
((
semi-bundle(S, P ) ∧ conseq(cs, S)∧
satisfiable(cs, σ,=S∪A)
)
⇒ well-typed(σ)
)
.
From Def. 6 (type-flaw attack), this implies,
¬typeFlawAttack(P,=S∪A).
Since we started out assuming that P is a NUT-Satisfying protocol, we sum up noting
that NUT-Satisfying protocols are not susceptible to type-flaw attacks.
5.2 µ-NUT prevents multi-protocol attacks
We will now prove that µ-NUT-Satisfying protocols are not susceptible to multi-protocol
attacks.
The idea is to show that if a protocol is secure in isolation, then it is in combination
with other protocols with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying .
To show this, we will achieve a contradiction by attempting to prove the contrapositive.
i.e., if there is a breach of secrecy for a protocol in combination with another protocol with
which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying , then it must also have a breach of secrecy in isolation.
We will follow the outline below:
1. We will first form a constraint sequence from a semi-bundle that has semi-strands
from the combination of a secure protocol and another protocol with which it is
µ-NUT-Satisfying;
2. We will then form another sequence that can be formed solely from a semi-bundle of
the secure protocol by extracting it from the constraint sequence of the combination
of semi-bundles;
3. Finally, we will show that any reduction rules to satisfy the former resulting in a
breach of secrecy can be equally applied on the latter, resulting in a breach of secrecy
in it as well (thereby achieving a contradiction).
We are now ready to prove our second main theorem.
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Theorem 2. In the =S∪A theory, if a protocol is secure for secrecy, then it remains so in
combination with any other protocol with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying .
Proof. Suppose P1 is a protocol that is secure for secrecy in isolation in the =S∪A theory.
i.e.,
secureForSecrecy(P1,=S∪A). (25)
Consider another protocol P2 such that, µ-NUT-Satisfying(P1, P2). Let, S1 and S2 be
two semi-bundles from P1 and P2 respectively:
semi-bundle(S1, P1) ∧ semi-bundle(S2, P2). (26)
Consider a constraint sequence combcs from Scomb = S1∪S2. i.e., conseq(combcs, Scomb).
Consider another constraint sequence isocs , where,
(a) Targets in combcs are targets in isocs if the targets belong to S1:
(∀m : in combcs)((m ∈ Terms(S1))⇒ (m : in isocs)). (27)
(b) Term sets in combcs are term sets in isocs but without terms from S2:
(
∀m1 : T1,
m2 : T2 in combcs
)


m1 : T1 ≺combcs m2 : T2
⇒
(∃T ′1, T
′
2)

 (m1 : T ′1 ≺isocs m1 : T ′2)∧(T ′1 = T1 \ T ′′1 ) ∧ (T ′2 = T2 \ T ′′2 )
(∀t ∈ T ′′1 ∪ T
′′
2 )(t ∈ SubTerms(S2))



 .
(28)
Then, from Def. 5 (Constraints) we have that isocs is a constraint sequence from S1
alone. i.e., conseq(isocs , S1).
Suppose combcs and isocs are normalized. To achieve a contradiction, let there be a
violation of secrecy in Scomb s.t. combcs is satisfiable after an artificial constraint with a
secret constant of S1, say sec, is added to it:
(combcs = [ : , . . . , : T ]) ∧ satisfiable(combcs⌢[sec : T ], ,=S∪A). (29)
Suppose [r1, . . . , rn] = R, such that r1, . . . , rn ∈ Rules . Then, from the definition of
satisfiability (1), using R, say we have:


(combcs = [ : , . . . , : T ])∧
applicable(r1, combcs
⌢[sec : T ], combcs1, {}, σ1,=S∪A)∧
applicable(r2, combcs
′
1, combcs2, σ1, σ2,=S∪A) ∧ . . .∧
applicable(rn, combcs
′
n−1, combcsn, σn−1, σn,=S∪A)∧
simple(combcsn) ∧ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(combcs
′
i = normalize(combcsi))

 . (30)
From their descriptions, every rule in Rules adds subterms of existing terms (if any) in
the target or term set of the active constraint:
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(
applicable( , cs, cs′, , , ) ∧ active(m : T, cs)∧
active(m′ : T ′, cs′) ∧ (x ∈ T ′ ∪m′)
)
⇒ (x ∈ SubTerms(T ∪m)). (31)
Since every combcs ′i (i = 1 to n) in (30) is normalized, and since P1 and P2 are
µ-NUT-Satisfying , we have that no XOR term in the target or term sets of any of combcs ′i
(i = 1 to n) have free variables:
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})

 active(m : T, combcs ′i) ∧ (p ∈ N)∧(t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tp ∈ T ∪m)⇒
(∀j ∈ {1, . . . , p})(tj /∈ Vars)

 . (32)
Suppose chcombcs is a normal, child constraint sequence of combcs and chisocs is a
normal, child constraint sequence of isocs.
un and ksub are the only rules that affect the attacker substitution. We will show that
these are equally applicable on chcombcs and chisocs. Suppose:
• Γ = {m
?
=S∪A t}, is a (S ∪ A)-UP and suppose m = m′σcomb , t = t′σcomb , where
m′ ∈ SubTerms(S1);
• Variables in σcomb are substituted with terms from the same semi-bundle:
(∀x/X ∈ σcomb)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si))). (33)
(This is vacuously true if un or ksub were never applied on combcs, to derive chcombcs,
since σcomb is then empty).
• Γ is (S ∪ A)-Unifiable.
Let τ ∈ AS∪A(Γ). Then, from Def. 10 (Combined Unifier), τ ∈ τSTD ⊙ τACUN, where
τSTD ∈ ASTD(Γ5.1) and τACUN ∈ AACUN(Γ5.2).
Now from BSCA, if m1
?
=STD t1 ∈ Γ5.1, and θ ∈ USTD({m1
?
=STD t1}), then we have
the following cases:
Variables. If m1, and/or t1 are variables, from (32) and BSCA, they are necessarily new
i.e., m1, t1 ∈ Vars \ Vars(Γ) (unless m and t are variables, which they are not, since
chcombcs is normal). Hence, there are no new substitutions in θ to Vars(Γ) in this case.
Constants. If m1 ∈ Constants(S1), again from BSCA, t1 cannot belong to Vars , and
it must be a constant. If m1 is a fresh constant of S1, then t1 must also belong to S1
from Assumption 6 (freshness) and (33), and if m1 is not fresh, t1 could belong to either
SubTerms(S1) or IIK from Assumption 5. Further, θ = {}.
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Public Keys. If m1 = pk( ), then t1 must be some pk( ) as well. From BSCA, m1 cannot
be such that [ ]→m1 ⊏ m. Further, there cannot be an XOR term, say . . . ⊕m1 ⊕ . . . that is
a subterm of m, from µ-NUT Condition 2. The only other possibility is that m = m1. In
that case, t must also equal t1, whence, t can belong to IIK from assumption 4 (Intruder
possesses all public-keys). Hence, we have that, (∀x/X ∈ θ)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈
SubTerms(Si))).
Shared keys. m1 cannot be a long-term shared-key; i.e., m1 6= sh( , ), since from As-
sumptions 2 and 3, they do not appear as interms and from the definition of Γ5.1, m1 is
necessarily an interm.
Encrypted Subterms. Suppose m1 = m11σcombρ, t1 = t11σcombρ, where m11, t11 ∈
EncSubt(S1 ∪ S2) and ρ is a set of substitutions from VarIdP defined in Lemma 3. Then,
from µ-NUT Condition 1 and (31), we have, m11, t11 ∈ EncSubt(Si), where i ∈ {1, 2}.
Hence, (∀x/X ∈ θ)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si))).
Sequences. If m1 is a sequence, either m must be a sequence, or there must be some
. . . ⊕ m1 ⊕ . . . belonging to SubTerms({m, t}), from BSCA. But m and t cannot be se-
quences, since chcombcs is normal. Hence, by µ-NUT Condition 2 and (31), m1, t1 ∈
SubTerms(Si)σcombρ, i ∈ {1, 2} and (∀x/X ∈ θ)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si))).
In summary, we make the following observations about problems in Γ5.1.
If m1 is an instantiation of a subterm in S1, then so is t1, or t1 belongs to IIK :
(∀m1
?
= t1 ∈ Γ5.1)(m1 ∈ SubTerms(S1)σcombρ⇒ t1 ∈ SubTerms(S1)σcombρ ∪ IIK ).
(34)
Every substitution in τSTD has both its term and variable from the same semi-bundle:
(∀x/X ∈ τSTD)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si))). (35)
Now consider the UPs in Γ5.2. Applying (32) into Lemma 3, we have that τACUN = {}.
Combining this with (35), we have:
(∀x/X ∈ τ)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si)σcomb)). (36)
Suppose m = m1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ mp and t = t1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ tq; p, q ≥ 1, x = mτ , y = tτ and
m′′ =S∪A xwherem′′ = m′1⊕. . .⊕m′p′ , s.t. (∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , p′})(i 6= j ⇒ m′iτ 6=S∪A m′jτ)
and t′′ =S∪A y, where t′′ = t′1 ⊕ . . .⊕ t′q′ , s.t. (∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , q′})(i 6= j ⇒ t′iτ 6=S∪A t′jτ).
Informally, this means that, no two terms in {m′1, . . . , m′p′} or {t′1, . . . , t′q′} can be canceled.
Now, mτ =S∪A tτ implies, (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , p′})((∃j ∈ {1, . . . , q′})(m′iτρ =STD t′jτρ))
with p′ = q′. From (34) and µ-NUT, this means that m ∈ SubTerms(S1)σcomb implies, t
also belongs to SubTerms(S1)σcomb or IIK .
Now since Vars(m′)∪Vars(t′) ⊂ Vars(S1), we have,m′σcomb = m′σiso , and t′σcomb =
t′σiso , where σcomb = σiso ∪ {x/X | x,X ∈ SubTerms(S2)}. Combining this with (36),
we have that, m′σcombτ =S∪A t′σcombτ ⇒ m′σisoτ =S∪A t′σisoτ .
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Combining these with (27) and (28), we can now write:
(∀chcombcs, chisocs)


applicable(un, chcombcs, chcombcs ′, σcomb , σ
′
comb ,=S∪A)
childseq(chcombcs, combcs,=S∪A)∧
childseq(chisocs, isocs ,=S∪A)⇒
applicable(un, chisocs, chisocs ′, σiso , σ
′
iso ,=S∪A)

 .
(37)
where, the active constraint in chcombcs and chisocs only differ in the term sets:

 active(m : ∪ t, combcs) ∧ active(m : ∪ t, isocs)∧(combcs ′ = combcs<τ⌢combcs>τ) ∧ (isocs ′ = isocs<τ⌢isocs>τ)∧
(σ′comb = σcomb ∪ τ) ∧ (σ
′
iso = σiso ∪ τ) ∧ (τ ∈ US∪A({m
?
=S∪A t}))


From (35) we have, (∀t ∈ SubTerms(S1))(tσcomb = tσiso), and hence we have that
all the rules in Rules \ {un, ksub} are applicable on the target of the active constraint of
chisocs, if they were on chcombcs, provided they are applied on a term in SubTerms(S1):
(∀r ∈ Rules)

 applicable(r, chcombcs, chcombcs ′, , ,=S∪A)∧active(m : , chcombcs) ∧ active(m′ : , chcombcs ′)∧
active(m : , chisocs)

⇒
(
applicable(r, chisocs, chisocs ′, , ,=S∪A) ∧ active(m
′ : , chisocs ′)
)
.
(38)
Similarly, all rules that are applicable on a term in the term set of the active constraint
in chcombcs, say c, are also applicable on the same term of the active constraint in chisocs,
say c′ (provided the term exists in the term set of c′, which it does from (28) and (31)):
(∀r ∈ Rules)

 applicable(r, chcombcs, chcombcs ′, , ,=S∪A)∧active( : ∪ t, chcombcs) ∧ active( : ∪ T ′, chcombcs ′)∧
active( : ∪ t, chisocs)

⇒
(
applicable(r, chisocs, chisocs ′, , ,=S∪A) ∧ active( : ∪ T
′, chisocs ′)
)
.
(39)
Finally, we can combine, (30), (38), (39), and (37) to infer:


(isocs = 〈 : , . . . , : T 〉) ∧ applicable(r1, isocs
⌢[sec : T ], isocs1, {}, σ1,=S∪A)∧
applicable(r2, isocs
′
1, isocs2, σ1, σ2,=S∪A) ∧ . . .∧
applicable(rp, isocs
′
p−1, isocsp, σp−1, σp,=S∪A)∧
simple(isocsp) ∧ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , p})(isocs
′
i = normalize(isocsi))

 .
(40)
where [r1, . . . , rp] is a subsequence6 of R (defined in 30).
This in turn implies satisfiable(isocs⌢sec : T, σp,=S∪A) from the definition of satisfia-
bility.
6
s
′ is a subsequence of a sequence s, if s = ⌢s′⌢ .
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We can then combine this with the fact that S1 is a semi-bundle of P1, and isocs is a
constraint sequence of S1 and conclude:
semi-bundle(S1, P1) ∧ conseq(isocs, S1) ∧ (isocs = [ : , . . . , : T ])∧
satisfiable(isocs⌢[sec : T ], σp,=S∪A).
But from Definition 7 (Secrecy), this implies, ¬secureForSecrecy(P1,=S∪A), a contra-
diction to the hypothesis. Hence, P1 is always secure for secrecy in the =S∪A theory, in
combination with P2 (or any other set of protocols) with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying .
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided formal proofs that tagging to ensure non-unifiability of distinct
encryptions prevents type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks under the ACUN properties in-
duced by the Exclusive-OR operator. We will now discuss some prospects for future work
and related work.
6.1 Future work
Our results can be achieved under other equational theories the same way as we achieved
them under the ACUN theory: When we use BSCA, the unification algorithms for the other
theories will return an empty unifier, since their problems will have only constants as sub-
terms. Hence, unifiers only from the standard unification algorithm need to be considered,
which are always well-typed for NUT-Satisfying protocols. In addition, this reasoning has
to be given within a symbolic constraint solving model that takes the additional equational
theories into account (the model we used, adapted from [5] was tailored to accommodate
only ACUN).
Our result on type-flaw attacks is obviously independent of security properties: It is
valid for any property that can be tested on all possible protocol execution traces. Hence,
we conjecture that it will also be valid for properties such as observational equivalence,
which has been of interest to many protocol researchers of late (e.g. [3, 17]). However, this
property has been traditionally defined only in the applied pi-calculus. To use the results of
this paper, we would have to first define an equivalent definition with symbolic constraint
solving which is the model used in this paper (perhaps by extending [13]).
We achieved our result on multi-protocol attacks, specifically for secrecy. The reason
for this was that, in order to prove that attacks exist in isolation, if they did in combination,
we had to have a precise definition as to what an “attack” was to begin with. However,
other properties such as authentication and observational equivalence can be considered on
a case-by-case basis with similar proof pattern.
At the core of our proofs is the use of BSCA. However, their algorithm only works
for disjoint theories that do not share any operators. For instance, the algorithm cannot
consider equations of the form,
[a, b]⊕ [c, d] = [a⊕ c, b⊕ d].
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We plan to expand our proofs to include such equations in future. However, it can
be easily seen that the proof of Theorem 1 falls apart under this equation. For instance,
consider the following unification problem:
[nonce, NA]
?
= [nonce, nb]⊕ [agent, a]⊕ [agent, b].
Now this problem is not unifiable under =S∪A theory, but it is when we add the new
equation above to the theory, since NA can be substituted with nb⊕a⊕ b to make the terms
equal, which is an ill-typed substitution. It does not seem that a similar effect exists on
multi-protocol attacks, but we intend to investigate further in that direction.
The most significant advantage of being able to prevent type-flaw attacks is that analy-
sis could be restricted to well-typed runs only. This has been shown to assist decidability
results in the standard, free theory [28, 40] but not under monoidal theories. We are cur-
rently in a pursuit to achieve a decidability result for protocol security in the presence of
XOR.
6.2 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, the consideration of algebraic properties and/or equational
theories for type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks is unchartered waters with the exception
of a recent paper [9].
Type-flaw attacks. Type-flaw attacks on password protocols were studied by Malladi et
al. in [31]. That is the closest that we know about any study of type-flaw attacks where the
perfect encryption assumption was relaxed. Some recent works studied type-flaw attacks
using new approaches such as rewriting [38], and process calculus LySa [19]. However,
they do not discuss type-flaw attacks under operators with algebraic properties.
Recently in [34], we gave a proof sketch that tagging prevents type-flaw attacks even
under XOR. The current paper is an extended, journal version of [34] with the addition of a
new result for multi-protocol attacks.
A proof was presented in Malladi’s PhD dissertation [29] that type-flaw attacks can
be prevented by component numbering with the constraint solving model of [37] as the
framework. A similar proof approach was taken by Arapinis et al. in [1] using Comon et
al.’s constraint solving model [12] as the framework. In [7], we used the proof style of [29]
to prove the decidability of tagged protocols that use XOR with the underlying framework
of [5] which extends [37] with XOR. That work is similar to our proofs since we too use the
same framework ([5]). Further, we use BSCA as a core aspect of this paper along the lines
of [7].
Multi-protocol attacks. Kelsey et al. in their classical work [25] showed that for any
protocol, another protocol can be designed to attack it. Cremers studied the feasibility
of multi-protocol attacks on published protocols and found many attacks, thereby demon-
strating that they are a genuine threat to protocol security [16]. However, Cremers did not
consider algebraic properties in the analysis.
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A study of multi-protocol attacks with the perfect encryption assumption relaxed were
first studied by Malladi et al. in [32] through “multi-protocol guessing attacks” on password
protocols. Delaune et al. proved that these can be prevented by tagging in [17].
The original work of Guttman et al. in [21] assumed that protocols would not have
type-flaw attacks when they proved that tagging/disjoint encryption prevents multi-protocol
attacks. But a recent work by Guttman seems to relax that assumption [20]. Both [21]
and [20] use the strand space model [42]. Our protocol model in this paper is also based
on strand spaces but the penetrator actions are modeled as symbolic reduction rules in the
constraint solving algorithm of [5, 37], as opposed to penetrator strands in [42]. Cortier-
Delaune also seem to prove that multi-protocol attacks can be prevented with tagging,
which is slightly different from [21] and considers composed/non-atomic keys [15]. They
too seem to use constraint satisfiability to model penetrator capabilities.
None of the above works considered the XOR operator or any other operator that pos-
sesses algebraic properties.
In a recent paper that is about to appear in the CSF symposium, Ciobaca and Cortier
seem to present protocol composition for arbitrary primitives under equational theories with
and without the use of tagging [9]. Their results seem very general and broadly applicable.
As future work, they comment in the conclusion of that paper that it is a challenging open
problem to address cases where multiple protocols uses XOR, which is solved in this paper.
XOR operator. Ryan and Schneider showed in [41] that new attacks can be launched on
protocols when the algebraic properties of the XOR operator are exploited. In [6], Chevalier
et al. described the first NP-decision procedure to analyze protocols that use the XOR
operator with a full consideration of its algebraic properties. We use an adapted version
of their NSL protocol in this paper as a running example. In an impressive piece of work,
Chevalier also introduced a symbolic constraint solving algorithm for analyzing protocols
with XOR, which we use as our framework in this paper [5].
In an interesting work [26], Kuesters and Truderung showed that the verification of
protocols that use the XOR operator can be reduced to verification in a free term algebra,
for a special class of protocols called ⊕-linear protocols7, so that ProVerif can be used for
verification.
Chen et al. recently report an extension of Kuesters-Truderung to improve the efficiency
of verification by reducing the number of substitutions that need to be considered (thereby
improving the performance of ProVerif), and a new bounded process verification approach
to verify protocols that do not satisfy the ⊕-linearity property [4].
These results have a similarity with ours, in the sense that we too show that the algebraic
properties of XOR have no effect when some of the messages are modified to suit our
requirements.
A few months back, Chevalier-Rusinowitch report a nice way to compile cryptographic
protocols into executable roles and retain the results for combination of equational theories
in the context of compiling [8]. Like other works described above, their work does not
seem to use tagging.
7Kuesters-Truderung define a term to be ⊕-linear if for each of its subterms of the form s⊕ t, either t or
s is ground.
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A Appendix
In the appendix, we first provide an index for the notation and terminology in Section A.1.
We then provide a detailed formalization of Baader & Schulz Algorithm for combined
theory unification [2] in Section A.2.
A.1 Index - Notation and Terminology
A.1.1 Symbols
[t1, . . . , tn] Sequence of terms t1 through tn, that are linearly ordered.
[t]→k t encrypted using k with an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
[t]↔k t encrypted using k with a symmetric encryption algorithm.
h(t) The hash of t using some hashing algorithm.
sigk(t) The signature of t using a private key that is verifiable with the
public-key k.
t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn Terms t1 through tn XORed together.
⌢ s⌢1 s2 indicates concatenation of two sequences s1 and s2.
≺t A linear order relation obeyed by the elements of a sequence t;
Read ti ≺t tj as ti precedes tj in the sequence t;
∏n
i=1 ci Sequence concatenation of c1 through cn.
⊏ Subterm relation; t ⊏ t′ indicates t is a part of t′.
⋐ Interm relation; t ⋐ t′ implies that t equals t′ or an interm of one of the
elements of t′ if t′ is a sequence or is part of the plain-text,
if t′ is an encryption;
P(X) Power-set of X;
x/X x is substituted for the variable X;
σ, τ, ρ, α, β Sets of substitutions;
Σ Sets of sets of substitutions;
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t =Th t
′ t is equal to t′ in the theory Th;
Γ A unification problem or a finite set of equations;
AE Unification algorithm that returns the most general unifiers
in the theory =E for a E-Unification Problem;
(S ∪ A) STD ∪ ACUN;
Γ3 Obtained from Γ2 such that, variables in Γ2 are replaced by other
variables in their equivalence classes in a variable identification
partition on the variables called VarIdP ;
Γ4.1 Γ3 split into problems from only the theory Th1;
Γ4.2 Γ3 split into problems from only the theory Th2;
V1, V2 {V1, V2} is a partition on the variables of Γ3;
Γ5.1 Variables in Γ4.1 that belong to V2 are replaced by new constants;
Γ5.2 Variables in Γ4.2 that belong to V1 are replaced by new constants;
α, β The sets of substitutions for the replacement of variables with
new constants in Γ5.1 and Γ5.2;
< X < Y indicates that variable X is not a subterm of an instantiation of Y ;
⊙ σ1 ⊙ σ2 is the combined unifier of σ1 and σ2 in the theory Th1 ∪ Th2,
if σ1 is the unifier for Γ5.1 and σ2 is the unifier for Γ5.2;
m : T A constraint describing that term m should be derivable by
using attacker actions on the set of terms T ;
+t A node that sends a term t;
−t A node that receives a term t;
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A.1.2 Words
Vars Set of all variables;
Constants Set of all constant values that are indivisible (nonce, agent etc.)
in a in as represents a is an element in the sequence as;
T (F,Vars) Term algebra; Set of all terms using function symbols
F and Vars
Terms() Overloaded function returning all the terms in a set of terms, strands,
or set of strands.
type() Function returning the type of a term (agent, nonce,
nonce encrypted with a public-key etc.)
SubTerms() Overloaded function returning all the subterms in a set of terms, strands,
protocol, or semi-bundle.
EncSubt() Overloaded function returning all the encrypted subterms
of a term, or set of strands;
well-typed() Predicate returning true if a substitution or sets of substitutions
are such that values are substituted to variables of the same type;
STD Set of identities involving StdOps-Terms that is the basis
for =STD theory;
ACUN Set of identities involving only the ⊕ operator to
reflect it’s ACUN algebraic properties
disjoint(Th1,Th2) Predicate returning true if Th1 and Th2 do not share operators;
ast(t′, t,Th) Predicate returns true if t′ is a subterm of t
and made with operators not belonging to Th;
pure(t,Th) Predicate returning true if t has no alien subterms wrt
operators of Th;
NewVars A subset of Vars that did not previously appear in a
unification problem;
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NewConstants A subset of Constants that did not previously appear in a
unification problem;
VarIdP A partition on all the variables in a unification problem;
least(x,X,<) Returns true if x is the minimal element of X wrt the
linear relation <;
Node Tuple 〈±, Term〉
Strand Sequence of nodes
FreshVars Variables in a strand that are of the
type nonce, session-key etc.;
LTKeys() Returns the set of subterms in a protocol that resemble
sh( , );
semi-strand Strand obtained by instantiating the known variables
of a role;
semi-bundle Set of semi-strands;
constraint(〈m, T 〉) true if m : T is a constraint with m as the target and
T as the termset
conseq(cs, S) cs is a constraint sequence from the semi-bundle S;
simple(c) c is a constraint with only a variable on its target;
simple(cs) cs is a constraint sequence with only simple constraints;
active(c, cs) true if all constraints in cs, prior to c are simple;
cs< Returns the constraint sequence prior to the active
constraint of cs;
cs> Returns the constraint sequence after to the active
constraint of cs;
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applicable(r, cs, cs′, σ, σ′,Th) true if r is applicable on cs, transforming it into cs′, and
changing its substitution from σ to σ′ in the theory Th;
normal(cs) true if cs has no free variables, or pairs
in the target or termset of its active constraint;
normalize(cs) Function that transforms cs into a normal
constraint sequence and returns it;
typeFlawAttack(P,Th) true if a constraint sequence from a semi-bundle of P
can only be satisfied with an ill-typed substitution in the
theory Th;
secureForSecrecy(P,Th) true if protocol P does not have a potential breach
of secrecy in the theory Th;
NUT-Satisfying(P ) true if P satisfies three conditions including non-unifiable
encrypted subterms (in the S ∪ A theory), no free
variables as asymmetric keys inside
XOR terms;
µ-NUT-Satisfying(P1, P2) true if encrypted subterms of P1 are non-unifiable with the
encrypted subterms of P2, in the S ∪ A theory;
A.2 Bader & Schulz Combined Theory Unification Algorithm (BSCA)
We will now consider how two UAs for two disjoint theories =E1 and =E2 , may be com-
bined to output the unifiers for (E1 ∪ E2)-UPs using Baader & Schulz Combination Algo-
rithm (BSCA) [2].
We will use the following (S ∪ A)-UP as our running example8:{
[1, na]pk (B)
?
=S∪A [1, NB]pk (a) ⊕ [2, A]⊕ [2, b]
}
.
BSCA takes as input a (E1 ∪E2)-UP, say Γ, and applies some transformations on them
to derive Γ5.1 and Γ5.2 that are E1-UP and E2-UP respectively.
Step 1 (Purify terms)
BSCA first “purifies” the given set of (E = E1∪E2)-UP, Γ, into a new set of problems Γ1,
such that, all the terms are pure wrt =E1 or =E2 .
8We omit the superscript→ on encrypted terms in this problem, since they obviously use only asymmetric
encryption.
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If our running example was Γ, then, the set of problems in Γ1 are W
?
=STD [1, na]pk (B),
X
?
=STD [1, NB]pk(a), Y
?
=STD [2, A], Z
?
=STD [2, b], and W
?
=ACUN X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z, where
W,X, Y, Z are obviously new variables that did not exist in Γ.
Step 2. (Purify problems)
Next, BSCA purifies Γ1 into Γ2 such that, every problem in Γ2 has both terms pure wrt the
same theory.
For our example problem, this step can be skipped since all the problems in Γ1 already
have both their terms purely from the same theory (=STD or =ACUN)).
Step 3. (Variable identification)
Next, BSCA partitions Vars(Γ2) into a partition VarIdP such that, each variable in Γ2 is
replaced with a representative from the same equivalence class in VarIdP . The result is
Γ3.
In our example problem, one set of values for VarIdP can be
{{A}, {B}, {NB}, {W}, {X}, {Y, Z}} .
Step 4. (Split the problem)
The next step of BSCA is to split Γ3 into two UPs Γ4.1 and Γ4.2 such that, each of them has
every problem with terms from the same theory, Th1 or Th2.
Following this in our example,
Γ4.1 =
{
W
?
=STD [1, na]pk (B), X
?
=STD [1, NB]pk (a), Y
?
=STD [2, A], Z
?
=STD [2, b]
}
,
and
Γ4.2 =
{
W
?
=ACUN X ⊕ Y ⊕ Y
}
.
Step 5. (Solve systems)
The penultimate step of BSCA is to partition all the variables in Γ3 into a size of two: Let
p = {V1, V2} is a partition of Vars(Γ3). Then, the earlier problems (Γ4.1, Γ4.2) are further
split such that, all the variables in one set of the partition are replaced with new constants
in the other set and vice-versa. The resulting sets are Γ5.1 and Γ5.2.
In our sample problem, we can form {V1, V2} as {Vars(Γ3), {}}. i.e., we choose that
all the variables in problems of Γ5.2 be replaced with new constants. This is required to find
the unifier for the problem (this is the partition that will successfully find a unifier).
So Γ5.1 stays the same as Γ4.1, but Γ5.2 is changed to
Γ5.2 = Γ4.2β =
{
W
?
=ACUN X ⊕ Y ⊕ Y
}
β =
{
w
?
=ACUN x⊕ y ⊕ y
}
.
i.e., β = {w/W, x/X, y/Y }, where, w, x, y are constants, which obviously did not
appear in Γ5.1.
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Step 6. (Combine unifiers)
The final step of BSCA is to combine the unifiers for Γ5.1 and Γ5.2, obtained using AE1 and
AE2 . This was given in Def. 10.
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